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In the last decade, there has been growing interest in Vehicular Ad Hoc NETworks (VANETs). Today 
car manufacturers have already started to equip vehicles with sophisticated sensors that can provide 
many assistive features such as front collision avoidance, automatic lane tracking, partial autonomous 
driving, suggestive lane changing, and so on. Such technological advancements are enabling the adoption 
of VANETs not only to provide safer and more comfortable driving experience but also provide many 
other useful services to the driver as well as passengers of a vehicle. However, privacy, authentication 
and secure message dissemination are some of the main issues that need to be thoroughly addressed 
and solved for the widespread adoption/deployment of VANETs. Given the importance of these issues, 
researchers have spent a lot of effort in these areas over the last decade. We present an overview of the 
following issues that arise in VANETs: privacy, authentication, and secure message dissemination. Then 
we present a comprehensive review of various solutions proposed in the last 10 years which address 
these issues. Our survey sheds light on some open issues that need to be addressed in the future.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Several applications such as early warning systems which can 
warn about road construction, collisions, weather-related hazards, 
merging lanes, speed limits for curves, and pedestrian crossing 
warnings, are ready for the widespread deployment in Vehicular 
Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs). Apart from assisting drivers to drive 
safely, VANETs can also provide infotainment to drivers/passengers 
for a more enjoyable driving as well as riding experience. Fur-
thermore, VANETs can also assist in paying for parking and tolls, 
finding parking places, updating inbuilt vehicle navigation systems 
with real-time traffic situation, and downloading music, video and 
software updates [1–3]. VANETs can also assist law enforcement 
agencies in reconstructing accidents as well as reaching the loca-
tion of the accidents faster.
The general model of VANETs proposed in the literature con-
sists of two major components: On Board Units (OBUs), installed 
on vehicles, and Road Side Units (RSUs) installed on roadside to 
support the infrastructure needed for the deployment of VANETs. 
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Each vehicle is assumed to be equipped with a set of sensors 
to collect phenomena surrounding the vehicle; the OBU processes 
the information collected by the sensors and sends/receives them 
to/from other relevant vehicles directly or through nearby RSUs [4]. 
The RSUs may also connect to the Internet to provide the nec-
essary services to vehicles. A broad range of applications can be 
enabled by two main types of communication: (i) infrastructure-
based communication (Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communica-
tion) and (ii) direct communication between vehicles (Vehicle to 
Vehicle (V2V) communication) [5] as shown in Fig. 1. Major ef-
forts for standardizing VANETs communication protocols have been 
carried out by the IEEE 802.11 Task Group by defining enhance-
ments to IEEE 802.11 required to support Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) applications. This amendment is currently known 
as IEEE 802.11p. The wireless communication capability between 
moving vehicles is achieved by using Dedicated Short Range Com-
munication (DSRC). It is anticipated that DSRC will be used for 
both V2V communication and V2I communication. The spectrum is 
seen as particularly useful because it can support low-latency, se-
cure transmissions, fast network acquisition and has the ability to 
handle rapid and frequent hand-overs that are inherent in VANETs; 
it is also robust in adverse weather conditions [6].
Although the excitement surrounding the potential benefits of 
VANETs is growing, the dynamic nature of VANETs (vehicles can 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100247
2214-2096/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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Fig. 1. VANET communication - infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less.
Fig. 2. Securing VANETs using a central Trusted Authority (TA).
join and leave at will) along with a multitude of system and ap-
plication related requirements make it very challenging to design 
efficient methods for ensuring privacy of vehicles. Privacy refers to 
the privacy of the vehicles (drivers) and the location of the ve-
hicles. When a vehicle sends a message, no one (except relevant 
authorities) should be able to determine the identity or location of 
the vehicle from the messages a vehicle sent. At the same time, all 
messages sent by a vehicle should be authenticated before being 
processed. Until these problems are solved to the best satisfaction 
of the users, widespread deployment of VANETs cannot take place. 
Authentication needs to be achieved at two levels – first at node 
level, referred as node authentication and second at the message 
level, referred as message authentication [7]. The basic principle 
of message authentication can be simplified as signing a message 
by the sender and then verifying the authenticity and integrity of 
the message at the receiver’s end. Certain authentication require-
ments such as low computational overhead, strong and scalable 
authentication, efficient and scalable certificate revocation must be 
addressed and solved to ensure secure communication in VANETs.
Ensuring privacy of vehicles (drivers) is one of the many chal-
lenging issues for which an efficient solution needs to be found 
because an adversary could otherwise trace a vehicle’s traveling 
routes by capturing and analyzing it’s messages [8] and identify 
the vehicle (driver) which may have drastic consequences for the 
drivers. To address this issue, many researchers have proposed 
protocols wherein vehicles use pseudonyms instead of their real 
ids in communication while at the same time enabling authori-
ties to extract the real ids from pseudonyms to trace and pun-
ish misbehaving vehicles. Such protocols are called conditional 
privacy-preserving protocols. Assigning pseudonyms to vehicles 
and changing them frequently is one of the strategies used to 
ensure privacy of vehicles. To maximize privacy, vehicles must 
change pseudonyms more frequently although the frequency of 
such change remains debatable. Factors such as availability and 
storage size play an important role in determining the rate at 
which pseudonym should be changed. A vast majority of the pa-
pers in the literature addressing security, authentication, and pri-
vacy use a TA for obtaining and loading OBUs and RSUs with secu-
rity parameters such as keys, certificates, and pseudonyms (Fig. 2).
Securing VANETs from attacks from malicious vehicles is also 
a challenging issue due to the dynamic nature of network forma-
tion [9]. Some of these attacks may be carried out by nodes inside 
the network (i.e., nodes that have been already authorized to be a 
member of the VANET); other attacks may be carried out by ve-
hicles that do not belong to the VANET. Among the existing types 
of attacks, message spoofing, message replay attack, message in-
tegrity attack, impersonation attack, Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
and movement tracking attack are the most common.
Traditional approaches for secure and authenticated message 
dissemination, largely based on message encryption and key man-
agement, can only guarantee secure message exchange between 
known source and destination pairs. These approaches cannot be 
directly applied in the context of VANETs due to the dynamic na-
ture of VANETs. Message dissemination in VANETs can also be vul-
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nerable to insider attacks (i.e., attacks from authenticated VANET 
members), who may tamper the content of the disseminated mes-
sages or send malicious messages. Thus, ensuring the integrity 
and authenticity of the messages transmitted in VANETs is an im-
portant issue. In this paper, we present a survey of some of the 
research works done in the last ten years addressing privacy, au-
thentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs.
For convenience, we summarize below some of the frequently 
used acronyms in this paper:
CCN: Content-Centric Networks
CRL: Certificate Revocation List
D2D: Device to Device
DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communication
DTNs: Delay Tolerant Networks
ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GUID: Global Unique Identifier
IBC: Identity Based Cryptography
ITS: Intelligent Transportation System
IVC: Inter-Vehicle Communication (same as V2V)
KDC: Key Distribution Center (same as TA)
LBS: Location-Based Service
MLGS: Message-Linkable Group Signature
OBU: On Board Unit
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
QoS: Quality of Service
RSU: Road Side Unit
SDN: Software Defined Network
TA: Trusted Authority
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TMKM: Topology Matching Key Management
USDOT: United States Department of Transportation
V2I: Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V: Vehicle to Vehicle
VANET: Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
VHN: Vehicular Heterogeneous Networks
VPKI: Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure
1.1. Contributions of this work
The main objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive 
review of the papers published in the last ten years which have 
proposed privacy and authentication solutions in VANETs. Existing 
survey papers focus mostly on specific issues or are general sur-
veys about VANETs. We do not have a comprehensive survey of the 
papers published in the last ten years addressing privacy, authen-
tication and secure message dissemination in VANETs. This work 
tries to fill this gap. In this survey, we classified the protocols into 
different categories based on the problems addressed as well as 
tools and techniques used to solve these problems; we also do a 
comparative study of the protocols in each category. Our classifi-
cation of the protocols is not strict because a protocol may belong 
to two or more categories. For example, a protocol that belongs to 
“Protocols based on Smart Cards and Tamper-proof Devices” cat-
egory may also belong to “Protocols Using Bilinear Pairing based 
Cryptography” also but not conversely. This work would also serve 
as a suitable reference for researchers working on privacy, authen-
tication and secure message dissemination in VANETs.
1.2. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
discuss some of the existing survey papers on VANETs in general 
and also the survey papers related to privacy, security and authen-
tication in VANETs. In Section 3, we present our survey of papers 
published in the last ten years, addressing privacy, authentication 
and secure message dissemination in VANETs. We discuss some 
open issues and future directions in Section 4. Finally, we make 
some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Related surveys on VANETs architectures, privacy, security and 
authentication in VANETs
Many survey papers related to VANETs have been published in 
the literature. In this section we discuss some of these survey pa-
pers published over the last 10 years.
Hartenstein and Laberteaux [2] present a comprehensive study 
on VANET applications, requirements, topology, channel features 
and models. The study also covers a brief introduction to the archi-
tectures, protocols and standards for VANETs. It also discusses the 
main challenges facing the widespread implementation of VANETs. 
A survey on the communication and performance requirements 
of Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) protocols is presented by 
Willke et al. [10]. They discuss the relevance of different protocols 
for specific types of IVC applications. Based on this relevance, ap-
plications are grouped into classes that share a common commu-
nication organization and performance requirements. They listed 
four types of IVC applications – “General Information Services, Ve-
hicle Safety Information Services, Individual motion control and 
Group Motion Control”. Karagiannis et al. [11] describe VANET 
application requirements, use cases, architectures, protocols, chal-
lenges and some solutions to address these challenges. They pri-
marily discuss the scope and objectives of several ITS projects, 
architectures and standards in the USA, Europe and Japan. Chal-
lenges in the area of anonymity and adaptive privacy, data centric 
trust and verification, geographical addressing, designing reliable 
message forwarding algorithm are also mentioned. Riley et al. [12]
discuss protocols that use group based and non-group based au-
thentication techniques based on both symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography.
Zeadally et al. [5] discuss recent research in the areas of “rout-
ing, broadcasting, Quality of Service (QoS) and security in VANETs”. 
They also present a comparative study of the following VANET sim-
ulators: SUMO, MOVE, TranNs, VanetMobiSim, and NCTuns. Current 
research status, challenges and potentials of VANETs are briefly 
described by Eze et al. [13]. They discuss how kinematic informa-
tion of vehicles can be used to support security of communicating 
vehicles. A vehicle’s recent location, position, velocity and accel-
eration are derived from the kinematic information exchange in 
V2V and V2I communication. Secure, authentic and reliable ex-
change of kinematic information is a challenging issue for both 
safety and non-safety related VANET applications. Whaiduzzaman 
et al. [14] present a survey of vehicular cloud computing along 
with its application, cloud formation, key management technique, 
inter-cloud communication and various privacy and security issues 
related to inter-cloud communication. They argue that vehicular 
cloud computing is feasible and more cost-effective compared to 
normal cloud computing. Mokhtar and Azab [9] present an hierar-
chical structure of various network layers for VANETs and potential 
attacks in these layers with corresponding counter measures. Petit 
et al. [15] discuss the life-cycle of pseudonyms based on asym-
metric key, identity, group signature and symmetric key. They also 
present a qualitative comparison of these four types of pseudonym 
schemes. Lu and Li [16] present a survey of privacy-preserving 
authentication of nodes and messages. They classify the various 
privacy-preserving authentication schemes based on the crypto-
graphic protocols used and the privacy preservation mechanisms 
used in these schemes. Then they discuss the open issues in this 
area. Gerla et al. [17] survey content distribution protocols for 
VANETs.
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Table 1
Summary of some of the recent survey papers on VANETs.
Paper Year published Area(s) Surveyed
Willke et al. [10] 2009 A survey of Inter-Vehicle Communication(IVC) Protocols and their applications.
Karagiannis et al. [11] 2011 A survey of vehicular networking application requirements, use cases, architectures, protocols, 
challenges and solutions.
Riley et al. [12] 2011 A survey of different authentication schemes for VANETs.
Zeadally et al. [5] 2012 A survey of routing techniques, Quality of Service (QoS) and security in VANETs.
Eze et al. [13] 2014 A survey of current research status, challenges, and potentials of VANETs.
Whaiduzzaman et al. [14] 2014 A survey of vehicular cloud computing.
Mokhtar et al. [9] 2015 A survey of security features, challenges, and attacks on VANETs.
Petit et al. [15] 2015 A survey of pseudonym schemes in VANETs.
Lu and Li [16] 2016 A Survey of privacy-preserving authentication schemes.
Azees et al. [18] 2016 A survey of security services in VANETs.
Sakizet al. [24] 2017 A survey of attacks and detection mechanism in VANETs and IoV.
Manvi et al. [25] 2017 A survey of authentication schemes for VANETs.
Bernardini et al. [19] 2017 A survey of security and privacy issues in VANETs.
Taimur et al. [23] 2017 A survey of certificate revocation techniques and protocols for VANETs.
Hasrouny et al. [26] 2017 A survey of security challenges and solutions for VANETs.
Ferrag et al. [27] 2017 Survey on privacy
Asuquo et al. [28] 2018 A survey of privacy-enhancing schemes and cryptography approaches for LBS in VANETs and 
mobile communication.
Lu et al. [30] 2019 A survey on authentication and location privacy protection mechanisms based on pseudonyms
Azees et al. [18] provide a detailed overview of security threats, 
solutions and related works on availability, confidentiality, authen-
tication, data integrity and non-repudiation in VANETs. They also 
propose a new secure dual authentication and key management 
technique for efficient communication in VANETs. Bernardini et 
al. [19] discuss the security and safety requirements for modern 
cars, architecture and safety features of AUTomotive Open System 
ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) [20]. They also provide a survey of re-
search work done in intra-vehicle communication and inter-vehicle 
communication, and also discuss security and privacy issues re-
lated to these communications. The Controller Area Network with 
Flexible Data rate (CAN-FD) [21], proposed by Gmph is considered 
to be suitable for intra-vehicle networking. Woo and Jo [22] pro-
pose a security architecture for CAN-FD.
Khan et al. [23] discussed a classification of different Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) distribution techniques using Vehicular Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (VPKI) and metrics to evaluate them. Sakiz 
and Sen [24] discuss existing works on threats and prevention 
mechanisms; most of the solutions discussed are for OBU-based 
communications which means that they do not need any dedi-
cated infrastructure such as RSUs. They also point out that Sybil 
attack is widely addressed by researchers while other types of at-
tacks are not very much addressed. Manvi and Tangade [25] focus 
on different authentication mechanisms presented in the literature 
and discuss their pros and cons. Hasrouny et al. [26] present a 
survey of VANETs security characteristics, architecture, protocols, 
challenges and solutions. They also present a comparative study of 
some of the existing security solutions. Ferrag et al. [27] present a 
critical survey of privacy-preserving protocols presented in the lit-
erature for mobile social networks and vehicular social networks. 
They survey the research works on location privacy, anonymity, 
and content-oriented privacy. Asuquo et al. [28] outline different 
security and privacy requirements, attacks and adversary models 
in Location Based Services (LBS) along with various metrics for 
evaluating location privacy in VANETs. They also discuss different 
privacy enhancing approaches presented in recent research works 
on ensuring location privacy in both VANETs and mobile networks. 
Boualouache et al. [29] discuss various pseudonym changing strate-
gies presented in the literature and compare the strength and 
weaknesses of these pseudonym changing strategies. Lu et al. [30]
presented a survey focusing on authentication schemes and loca-
tion privacy protection mechanisms based on pseudonyms. They 
also present a survey of various trust management models and 
also give an update on the latest mobility and network simula-
tors. None of the above surveys has presented a comprehensive 
survey of articles published in the last ten years addressing pri-
vacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs. 
In this paper, we try to fill this gap. Table 1 summarizes the areas 
surveyed by the survey papers that we discussed above.
3. Privacy, conditional privacy, authentication and secure 
message dissemination in VANETs
In this section, we group the protocols addressing Privacy, Au-
thentication and Secure Message Dissemination in VANETs into 
different classes and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the 
protocols in each class. As we mentioned earlier, it is not possi-
ble to provide a strict classification of the protocols because some 
protocols may fall into two or more different classes. This is only a 
broad classification.
3.1. Secure content distribution and advertisement dissemination in 
VANETs
RSUs can offer various services such as Internet access, real 
time traffic data access, maps, and media files download and soft-
ware updates download through high speed networks. Vehicle’s 
can make use of these services by connecting to the RSUs through 
VANET. Many of the research works on this type of service-
oriented vehicular communication did not take data security and 
location privacy of the users into consideration. Recently, adver-
tisements of commercial products to vehicles has been identified 
as a promising application for VANETs. But dissemination of adver-
tisements can be ineffective and insecure in the presence of non-
cooperative selfish vehicles and malicious vehicles. In this subsec-
tion, we discuss the protocols designed for secure content distri-
bution/downloading and advertisement dissemination in VANETs.
Huang et al. [31] propose an Anonymous Batch Authentication 
and Key Agreement (ABAKA) scheme to facilitate the deployment 
of value-added services in VANETs. To support value-added ser-
vices provided by Service Providers (SPs), communication between 
vehicles and SPs should be secure and the message authentica-
tion process should be efficient. ABAKA addresses this issue and 
allows multiple vehicles to be authenticated in batches, rather 
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Table 2
Summary of the protocols for secure content distribution.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and Weaknesses
Huang et al. [31] 2011 Authentication and secure content 
distribution
Generates pseudonyms similar to Lu 
et al. [32]; ECC.
Pseudonymous batched authentication; 
ensures secure communication between 
vehicles and service providers.
Lee et al. [34,35] 2012 Secure incentive-based dissemination 
of commercial ads
PKI and Signature-Seeking Drive (SSD) 
framework
Prevents dissemination of false or dummy 
ads; incentives may result in 
overspending.
Silva et al. [36] 2016 Secure content distribution in 
VANETs
Trajectory aware content distribution. Satisfies more users’ interest faster than 
typical CCNs [37,38].
than one vehicle at a time. It allows the creation of pseudonyms 
and the respective private keys for each vehicle to ensure condi-
tional privacy. Similar to the approach taken by Lu et al. [32], the 
Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) can generate private keys based on El-
liptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and the associated pseudonyms 
and store them. Requiring every vehicle to have a tamper-proof 
device installed may limit the participation of vehicles in VANET. 
Moreover, TPDs manufactured may be able to resist known attacks, 
but not necessarily all future attacks; TPDs could also be suscepti-
ble to side-channel attacks mentioned in [33].
Lee et al. [34,35] propose a Signature-Seeking Drive (SSD) 
which makes the dissemination of advertisements (ads) secure but 
also suggest providing incentives in the form of virtual cash to 
motivate non-cooperative vehicles to participate in ad dissemina-
tion. Many of the existing incentive schemes rely on tamper-proof 
hardware, but this scheme leverages on the public key infrastruc-
ture to provide incentives securely for cooperating nodes in both 
single level and multilevel transactions. In this scheme, the Vehicu-
lar Authority (VA) is in charge of advertisement authorization and 
maintenance. The VA also maintains the records of all the trans-
actions. After a vehicle receives an advertisement, it verifies the 
authenticity of the received ad and sends back its signed receipt to 
the sender of the ad. Thus, this scheme prevents the dissemination 
of false or dummy ads. However, when the number of co-operating 
vehicles increases, this may result in overspending on incentives 
and hence this approach may not be profitable to advertisers.
The Trajectory-aware Content distribution strategy (TraC), pro-
posed by Silva et al. [36], uses Content-Centric Networks (CCN) [37,
38] to build persistent proactive caches in RSUs. TraC is based 
on users’ trajectory to increase the probability of content deliv-
ery, which was not previously taken into account in the CCN based 
research works in VANET scenarios. In this scheme, RSUs can pro-
actively download the content requested from the Internet even 
before the arrival of a vehicle within the zone of an RSU. Thus the 
vehicle does not need to wait for the content to be downloaded 
when it arrives in the zone of an RSU. Triangular Area Forward-
ing (TAF) and Distance Minimization Forwarding (DMF) techniques, 
and a neighborhood discovery protocol are used to forward interest 
of vehicles to RSUs. The performance of TraC with respect to the 
content delivery ratio, and how fast content and interests are sat-
isfied is evaluated in the urban, highway and a realistic rush-hour 
(using Cologne dataset [39]) scenario. Their evaluation shows that 
TraC satisfies more users’ interests and faster compared to typi-
cal CCNs in general, and satisfies 50% more interests in the urban 
scenario.
Ramakrishnan et al. [40] present a cluster-based algorithm for 
broadcasting emergency messages in VANETs. They first form clus-
ters and the cluster-heads are responsible for intra-cluster manage-
ment. They also use MAC layer broadcast protocols for increasing 
the reliability of emergency message dissemination. Nkenyereye et 
al. [41] present a vehicular cloud based traffic data dissemination 
protocol. He et al. [42] present a dropbox based approach for dis-
seminating messages in VANETs. The dropbox based approach can 
cause delay in message dissemination and hence the receiver may 
not be able to get the messages on time. To address this problem, 
the authors first present a theoretical framework for estimating the 
delay; then they present a dropbox deployment algorithm. They 
use dimension enlargement and dynamic programming to design 
dropbox deployment algorithm.
Table 2 presents a summary of the protocols discussed in this 
section.
3.2. Protocols that use ID-based signatures and group signatures for 
authentication of messages
Generally, the Trusted Authority (TA) is responsible for issu-
ing security parameters, such as keys, certificates and pseudonyms 
to vehicles. When the TA detects (or is informed by an RSU) a 
malicious vehicle, it revokes the vehicle’s certificates (generally, 
one certificate for each pseudonym) and informs all other vehicles 
about it. This is a centralized approach which does not scale well. 
Moreover, as the CRL grows, the message authentication overhead 
increases. In this subsection, we discuss some solutions proposed 
for solving these problems using ID-based signatures and ID-based 
cryptography [43–45].
Jiang et al. [46] design a signature scheme and a signature ver-
ification scheme that helps the RSUs in verifying the signatures of 
the messages including beacon messages sent by vehicles within 
their transmission range fast and also identify bogus messages. 
This requires dense deployment of RSUs. Their scheme is based 
on Hess’s signature scheme [47] and ID-based encryption based on 
Weil pairing [45]. Their scheme requires the signatures of the mes-
sages from all vehicles within the transmission range of an RSU to 
be stored in a binary authentication tree (BAT) structure to facili-
tate fast verification of signatures. Under this scheme, the RSU can 
quickly distinguish the bogus messages from the authentic ones. 
Therefore, this scheme can tolerate, to a large extent, message 
flooding attacks. The TA is responsible for generating the keys and 
the associated pseudonyms and distributing them to the respective 
vehicles and the RSUs. The TA is also responsible for identifying 
the real id of malicious vehicles (RSU or law enforcement agencies 
can report pseudonyms vehicles suspected to be malicious to the 
TA) based on their pseudonym.
Zhang et al. [48] introduced an on-the-fly group creation ap-
proach in which the RSUs create and maintain groups. This allows 
vehicles to join the group maintained by the nearby RSU and also 
anonymously broadcast authenticated messages to vehicles within 
its group. However, authenticated message dissemination among 
vehicles in different groups is not addressed. Their approach is 
conditional privacy-preserving and it assumes RSUs are densely de-
ployed and trustworthy.
Xie et al. [49] develop a Privacy-Aware Monitoring System 
(PAMS) that acts as an aggregate query processor to protect the 
location privacy of vehicles by making the IDs of cars anonymous. 
The system aggregates vehicle IDs into partial IDs. The key idea is 
based on k-anonymity [50] in which every record released shares 
identifying information with at least k-1 other individuals. Zhang 
et al. [51] propose an ID-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme. 
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Batch verification allows verification of signatures received in a 
time window faster compared to verifying each signature one af-
ter the other. Their scheme uses improved Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 
(CL) signature [52] to verify a batch of signatures σ1, σ2, ..., σn of 
n messages M1, M2, ..., Mn from n different vehicles V 1, V 2, ..., Vn
all at once instead of one at a time. The verification involves check-
ing if one equation involving the parameters in the signatures is 
satisfied. The cost of computation involved in verifying if the equa-
tion is true is comprised of n multiplications n MapToPoint hash, 
3n additions, and n one-way hash operations. Thus, the verifica-
tion time for n signatures is a constant times n. This scheme is not 
resilient to DoS attacks such as Dummy Message Jamming (DMJ) 
attack. Moreover, Zhang et al’s. [51] scheme can not mitigate re-
play attack and it does not guarantee signature non-repudiation.
Lee and Lai [53] address the above drawbacks of Zhang et 
al’s. [51] scheme and extend Zhang et al.’s scheme by adding 
pseudo identity generation, message signing, and message verifi-
cation techniques. However, the performance of this approach may 
degrade when the number of invalid signatures increases. Bayat 
et al. [54] analyze the authentication scheme for VANETs intro-
duced by Lee et al. [53] and show how that scheme is vulnerable 
to the impersonation attack so that a malicious user can generate 
a valid signature on behalf of the other vehicles. Based on this ob-
servation, Bayat et al. [54] proposed an improved scheme which 
addresses this drawback of Lee et al.’s [53] scheme.
In the decentralized group authentication protocol presented by 
Zhang et al. [55], RSUs are responsible for maintaining and manag-
ing the group of vehicles within its transmission range for support-
ing secure communication between them. The basic idea behind 
their scheme is as follows: the central TA uses bilinear pairing for 
generating keys and issuing certificates to vehicles and RSUs. The 
TA also maintains the CRL. A Tracing Manager (TM) is responsible 
for tracing malicious vehicles. When a vehicle passes a nearby RSU, 
it uses signcryption [56] to send an encrypted request to the RSU 
for a group key. After receiving the group key, it uses the group 
signature scheme [57] to sign and send messages to members in 
its group. However, authenticated message dissemination between 
vehicles in different groups is not addressed.
For linking a message, signed using group key, to the origi-
nator of the message in the group, cryptographic technique such 
as message-linkable group signature (MLGS) [58] is used. Wu et 
al. [59] also propose a message-linkable group signature approach 
for thwarting Sybil attacks in VANETs. The priori and posteriori 
countermeasures used for authenticating messages are based on 
adaptive threshold authentication (in which a vehicle trusts a mes-
sage only if the number of anonymous vehicles endorsing the 
message is greater than or equal to the predetermined thresh-
old) which helps in speeding up verification and validation of a 
large number of messages in a single batch without compromising 
security. Xiong et al. [60] propose a scheme for managing commu-
nication among a group of vehicles effectively and spontaneously. 
Their scheme is based on revokable ring signatures proposed by 
Liu et al. [61]. This scheme allows only valid ring members to gen-
erate a ring signature for a message. In addition, trusted authorities 
are responsible for tracing and revoking the real signer. However, 
message verification overhead increases when the number of vehi-
cles in the group grows.
Lo et al. [62] use ID-based signature and Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography in their conditional privacy-preserving authentication 
scheme for communication between vehicles and RSUs. Their 
scheme supports batch verification to improve throughput. They 
show that their scheme has better performance compared to some 
of the existing pseudonym-based authentication schemes. Biswas 
et al. [63] present a scheme for authenticating safety messages 
broadcasted by RSUs. Their scheme is also based on ID-based sig-
natures [43,44] and uses proxy signatures based on Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the digital signature algo-
rithm specified in IEEE 1609.2 standard [64] for message authen-
tication. They compare the overhead incurred by their algorithm 
in signing and verification with that of a few other existing al-
gorithms. Among the five algorithms compared, their algorithm is 
the only one which uses both ID-based and proxy-based signature 
schemes and yields comparable performance.
Chim et al. [65] propose a software based Secure and Privacy 
Enhancing Communication Scheme (SPECS) which relies on ID-
Based Cryptography (IBC) with bilinear pairing. In this scheme, 
after an initial handshaking with the nearby RSU, vehicles belong-
ing to the same group can communicate securely without the aid 
of the RSU. They make use of two Bloom filters [75], namely, posi-
tive and negative filters to reduce the message overhead and false 
positives during message authentication. Positive filter stores the 
authentic vehicle’s hash value of pseudonym and messages, and 
the negative filter stores the hash value of pseudonym and mes-
sages of vehicles that have not been authenticated. It has low 
communication overhead and it also has an effective batch verifi-
cation success rate. However, it can be vulnerable to impersonation 
attack.
Hsiao et al. [66] present two broadcast authentication schemes 
(FastAuth and SelAuth) to deal with the signature flooding problem 
(i.e., reduce the computation overhead involved in verifying a large 
number of signatures in a short amount of time). The FastAuth 
protocol is based on chained Huffman hash trees (a data structure 
designed by them) for securing periodic single-hop beacon mes-
sages. This scheme supports a one-time signature scheme whose 
signature verification is claimed to be 50 times faster and signa-
ture generation is claimed to be 20 times faster than using Elliptic 
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the Digital Signature 
Algorithm specified in IEEE 1609.2 standard [64] for authentica-
tion. The other protocol, namely, the SelAuth protocol, helps in 
isolating malicious nodes faster by selecting messages that need 
to be verified before forwarding. They use a selection algorithm 
to distinguish benign neighbors from malicious neighbors which 
helps in restricting the spread of messages with invalid signatures 
to a small area. They also show that SelAuth incurs 10% - 35% ad-
ditional computational overhead compared to other closely related 
schemes while containing 99% of invalid signatures to one hop. 
They only focus on broadcast authentication and not point-to-point 
message authentication.
Wasef and Shen [72,73] try to reduce the time involved in 
checking the CRLs during message authentication; they use the 
keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), wherein the key 
used to calculate the HMAC is shared only between non-revoked 
OBUs. However, vehicles must still verify the validity of certifi-
cate and signature because it still uses a TA for generating and 
distributing secret keys and certificates to all OBUs. Certificate re-
vocation is triggered by the TA which involves revoking the current 
secret key and securely distributing a new secret key to all non-
revoked OBUs.
The dual authentication and key management technique pre-
sented by Vijayakumar et al. [67] is based on Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT) where both hash code and fingerprints of each 
participating vehicle are used for dual authentication. In their ap-
proach, the TA divides the users into two groups, namely Primary 
and Secondary, and then generates two different group keys for 
these two different groups of users. It provides service to vehi-
cles’ users on the basis of a Service Level Agreement (SLA). The 
shared group keys are refreshed when a new user joins the group 
or an existing group member leaves the group, thus making this 
scheme resistant to forward secrecy and backward secrecy attack. 
It is shown that this scheme is computationally more efficient 
compared to some of the other existing schemes, such as Chinese 
Remainder Group Key (CRGK) [76] and Key-tree Chinese Remain-
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Table 3
Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group signatures for authentication of messages.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Jiang et al. [46] 2009 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Hess’s signature scheme [47] and 
ID-based encryption based on Weil 
pairing [45]
Bogus message identification; batch verification; 
constructing Binary tree for storing signatures in 
dynamic environment; requires dense deployment of 
RSUs because authentication of messages is done by 
RSUs.
Xie et al. [49] 2010 Privacy aware traffic 
monitoring
PKI and Euler Histograms (EHs) Can process a large number of queries effectively and 
accurately. Many IDs need to be managed.
Zhang et al. [51] 2011 ID-based batch verification Improved Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 
(CL) signature [52]
Reduces message loss ratio and communication 
overhead; not resistant to DoS attack.
Bayat et al. [54] 2015 Privacy, security and 
authentication
ECC Addresses a drawback of the protocol presented in [53]
and presents a solution.
Lee and Lai [53] 2013 Efficient verification of 
messages
Bilinear pairing and batch verification 
with group testing
Can resist replay attack and non-repudiation attack; 
may not be able to detect illegal signatures.
Zhang et al. [55] 2010 Authentication, privacy, 
traceability and 
confidentiality
Bilinear pairing, group signature [57]
and signcryption [56]
RSUs are responsible for maintaining groups, so 
decentralized in some sense; no scalable mechanism to 
support broadcast throughout the network; 
group-signatures generally have high signature 
verification and revocation costs.
Wu et al. [59] 2010 Security, privacy and trust 
in V2V communication
Bilinear pairing, Message Linkable 
Group Signature (MLGS) and 
batch-verification
Accelerates verification of messages; difficult to manage 
revocation process.
Xiong et al. [60] 2010 Secure V2V communication Bilinear pairing and Revocable ring 
signatures [61]
Does not require ubiquitous deployment of RSUs; 
message verification cost may increase as the number of 
vehicles grows.
Lo et al. [62] 2011 Authentication, security and 
privacy
ID-based signature and ECDSA Supports batch verification.
Biswas et al. [63] 2011 Authentication ID and Proxy-based signature scheme Has lower overhead compared to some compared 
algorithms; addresses only authentication of RSU 
messages.
Chim et al. [65] 2011 Authentication, security and 
privacy
Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) 
with bilinear pairing
Low overhead and authenticates messages effectively; 
can be vulnerable to impersonation attack.
Hsiao et al. [66] 2011 Broadcast authentication Chained Huffman hash trees (based 
on Merkle hash tree and Huffman 
tree)
More efficient than ECDSA specified in IEEE 1609.2 
standard; the protocol for authenticating beacons will 
not work correctly if beacons are missed.
der Theorem (KCRT) [77]. However, they do not address the privacy 
of users in their work.
Zhang et al. [70] present a conditional privacy-preserving au-
thentication protocol based on ID-based aggregate signatures and 
bilinear pairing based cryptography. Their approach allows hierar-
chical aggregation of signatures and batch verification. Their hi-
erarchical aggregation technique allows re-aggregation which re-
duces transmission and storage overhead. Moreover, it has lower 
waiting time for aggregation compared to some of the other ap-
proaches presented in the literature.
Shao et al. [68] use group signatures and threshold authenti-
cation (in which a message is accepted by a vehicle only after it 
has been authenticated by a threshold number of other vehicles) 
to reduce the overhead related to downloading and checking CRL. 
It uses bilinear pairing based cryptography. Since RSUs serve as 
group managers, if RSUs are compromised, the group keys could 
be revealed. The location of vehicles can be traced by RSUs in 
this approach. The privacy-preserving authentication protocol pre-
sented by Zhang et al. [69] uses multiple trusted authorities (i.e., 
a central trusted authority and RSUs which are assumed to be 
trusted as well) and ID-based aggregate signatures. The same au-
thors also present two other protocols for message authentication 
based on aggregated signatures [70,78]. However, they do not com-
pare the performance of this protocol [69] with these two other 
protocols [70,78].
Lai et al. [71] discuss the security challenges, requirements and 
benefits of group communication in Software Defined Network 
(SDN) based 5G-VANETs. They propose a Secure Group Mobil-
ity management Framework (SGMF) for group-oriented vehicular 
communication based on modified IPsec packet and an addressing 
method described in [79]. Their scheme performs better compared 
to some of the existing mobility management schemes with re-
spect to hand over signaling overhead and latency. However, the 
hand over signaling cost may increase as the density and mobility 
of vehicles increase.
Cui et al. [74] propose a Secure Privacy-preserving Authentica-
tion scheme using Cuckoo Filter (SPACF). Their goal is to achieve 
higher success rate than some of the previously proposed schemes 
in the batch verification phase. Cuckoo filter and binary search 
are used to accomplish their goal. SPACF is shown to be more ef-
ficient than some of the previous schemes because it is pairing 
free and does not use map-to-point hash functions. However, this 
ID-based scheme still suffers from inherent key escrow problem 
despite eliminating much of the limitations of Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) and ID-based Batch Verification (IBV).
Table 3 and 4 summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the 
protocols discussed in this section.
3.3. Protocols that use RSUs for authentication and/or key distribution
Some protocols presented in the literature, offload some work 
(such as message authentication, packet forwarding) from vehicles 
to RSUs and/or some work (such as key management and CRL dis-
tribution, detecting and reporting suspicious vehicles) from TA to 
RSUs. In this subsection we discuss protocols belonging to this cat-
egory.
The RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE, 
proposed by Zhang et al. [80] offloads the overhead involved in 
message authentication to RSUs. This requires dense deployment 
of RSUs. Vehicles establish a shared key with the RSU using Diffie-
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Table 4
Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group signatures for authentication of messages continued.
Vijayakumar et al. [67] 2016 Secure data transmission in 
VANETs
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure 
(VPKI) and dual authentication and 
key management techniques
Provides resistance against forward secrecy and 
backward secrecy attacks; takes single broadcast 
message to get the updated group key; does not address 
location privacy.
Shao et al. [68] 2016 Privacy, security, and 
authentication
Bilinear pairing; group signatures; 
threshold based authentication
Facilitates revocation, unforgeability, anonymity, and 
traceability; overhead due to the use of bilinear pairing; 
group-signatures generally have higher signature 
verification and revocation costs; since RSUs serve as 
group managers if RSUs are compromised, the group 
keys could be revealed. The location of the vehicles can 
be tracked by RSUs in this approach.
Zhang et al. [69] 2017 Privacy, security, and 
authentication
Bilinear pairing based cryptography; 
multiple trusted authorities; ID-based 
aggregate signature technique for 
authentication
Certificate distribution is not centralized; Bilinear 
pairing based cryptography generally has high 
computational overhead.
Zhang et al. [70] 2016 Privacy, security and 
authentication
ID-based aggregate signatures; 
hierarchical aggregation of signatures 
and bilinear pairing based 
cryptography
Signature aggregation and re-aggregation helps in 
reducing transmission and storage overhead; waiting 
time needed for aggregation is also reduced compared 
to some other protocols; bilinear pairing based 
cryptography has high computation overhead.
Lai et al. [71] 2017 Secure group 
communication in SDN 
based 5G-VANETs
PKI; secure group management and 
group handover
Provides better group hand over authentication in terms 
of hand over signaling overhead and latency; cost may 
increase with increase in density and mobility of 
vehicles.
Wasef and Shen [72,73] 2009 Fast message authentication Bilinear pairing Claims to make the CRL checking process faster; High 
overheads involved in distributing a secret key to all 
non-revoked OBUs.
Cui et al. [74] 2017 Privacy, security and 
Authentication
Cuckoo filter and binary search 
methods
It is pairing free and does not use map-to-point hash 
functions; suffers from inherent key escrow problem.
Hellman algorithm. They also take the k-anonymity [50] approach 
to prevent an adversary from associating a message with a partic-
ular vehicle to ensure the privacy of the vehicles.
The message authentication scheme proposed by Zhang et 
al. [81] is an extension of the scheme presented in [80]; this exten-
sion includes a method for vehicles to cooperatively authenticate 
messages in the absence of an RSU. Hao et al. [82,141] present 
a distributed key management framework and also a method for 
cooperative message authentication for speeding up message au-
thentication. Sun et al. [83] also present a group signature and 
identity-based signature scheme for secure and authenticated mes-
sage dissemination. Papadimitratos et al. [84] also present a dis-
tributed method for distributing CRLs using RSUs to reduce the 
overhead involved in CRL distribution.
Lu et al. [85] propose a Social-based PRivacy-preserving packet 
forwardING (SPRING) protocol which prevents packet analysis at-
tack, packet tracing attack, black hole attack and grey hole attack 
in vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). This protocol relies 
on placing RSUs at high social intersections and using group sig-
natures to prevent the disclosure of identity of senders, target ve-
hicles and relaying vehicles. The RSUs help in forwarding packets 
between vehicles which helps in reducing packet loss.
Shim’s [86] Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication
Scheme (CPAS), is a secure conditional privacy-preserving scheme 
for V2I communications. It uses bilinear pairing based cryptogra-
phy to generate and store key parameters and ID-based signatures 
for authentication. Their scheme requires RSUs to verify messages 
sent by vehicles in batches to speed up the message authentication 
process. They do not address V2V communications.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) based schemes [87–89] and 
Topology Matching Key Management (TMKM) based schemes [90–
92] for Group Key Management (GKM) wherein all the key man-
agement functionalities are handled by the Key Distribution Center 
(KDC) have re-keying overhead. Park et al. [93] address this prob-
lem and propose a Group Key Management (GKM) scheme, called 
RSU-based Decentralized Key Management (RDKM). RDKM is based 
on versakey framework [94] for secure vehicular multicast commu-
nication. In this scheme, part of the GKM functions are offloaded to 
RSUs in a distributed manner. For efficient operation of this proto-
col, the authors suggest placing RSUs at the intersection of streets. 
For forming groups, the authors suggest placing vehicles within 
the region of an RSU in the same group. This helps an RSU manage 
the group keys efficiently. Their performance evaluation shows that 
this approach results in approximately 60% to 80% reduction in 
communication overhead compared to some of the existing GKM-
based schemes. They also propose a new performance measure 
namely, Group Key Management Overhead (GKMO), and observe 
a rapid increase in GKMO for both LKH and TMKM schemes com-
pared to the RDKM scheme. However, RDKM requires more storage 
space to store information about keys at each vehicle compared to 
the LKH and TMKM schemes.
In a Sybil attack, a malicious node can use multiple identities 
and inject false messages into the network. Zhou et al. [98] pro-
pose a protocol, called Privacy Preserving Detection of Abuses of 
Pseudonyms (P 2DAP), to detect Sybil attacks. In their scheme, the 
Department of Motor Vehicles is used as the TA to provide a pool 
of pseudonyms to each vehicle and releases part of its workload to 
RSUs as follows. Two-level hashing of every pseudonym is gener-
ated where the key of the first-level hash is known to the RSUs to 
identify whether the pseudonyms belong to the same group of ve-
hicles. The second-level hash key is known only to the TA to map 
each pseudonym to an individual vehicle. Each time an RSU finds 
suspicious pseudonyms, it reports this incident to the TA for veri-
fication. But the generation and management of a large number of 
pseudonyms can be costly.
The authentication and key establishment scheme for V2V and 
V2I communications, presented by Li et al. [95], is also based on 
ID-based public-key cryptography, blind signatures [100,101], and 
one-way hash chain. The blind signature scheme used in their 
scheme allows vehicles to communicate with the RSUs to access 
the services provided by them without revealing their real iden-
tities, location, and so on. They use TA for populating the OBUs 
with the necessary secret key, group key and pseudo id offline or 
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Table 5
Summary of the protocols that use RSUs for authentication and/or key distribution.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Li et al. [95] 2008 Location privacy and 
authentication
ID-based public-key cryptography, 
blind signature, and one-way hash 
chain
Solves location privacy, anonymity problem; uses a 
central trusted third party, which is not scalable.
Zhang et al. [80,81] 2008 Privacy, security and 
authentication
RSU-aided message authentication, 
cooperative message authentication, 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm and 
k-anonymity
Offloads the overhead involved in message 
authentication to RSUs; low communication 
overhead. Diffie-Hellman protocol is prone to 
man-in-the middle attack; vehicles still need to be 
pre-loaded with public keys; widespread deployment 
of RSUs is necessary.
Lin et al. [96] 2008 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Uses TA to get (public, private) keys; 
TESLA [97] hash chains for message 
authentication
Aims to reduce the overhead involved in certificate 
generation and distribution.
Lu et al. [85] 2010 Secure packet forwarding in 
vehicular DTNs and privacy
RSU assisted packet forwarding; 
Bilinear pairing
Provides high packet delivery ratio, preserves 
conditional privacy and resists packet tracing attack, 
packet analysis attack, and black (grey) hole attacks; 
ignores mobility of vehicles and fluctuations in traffic.
Park et al. [93] 2011 Distributed key 
management
PKI and RSU-based key management Reduces re-keying overhead; can have high storage 
overhead to store a large number of keys.
Zhou et al. [98] 2011 Privacy and security; Sybil 
Attack Detection
Distributed passive overhearing by 
RSUs; PKI based pseudonym 
assignment
Detects Sybil attacks with low overhead and delay.
Shim’s [86] 2012 Privacy and authenticated 
V2I communication
ID-based cryptography; bilinear 
pairing based cryptography for key 
generation
Fast batch verification of messages at the RSUs; 
vehicles need to be equipped with Tamper-Proof 
Devices (TPDs); TPDs could be susceptible to 
side-channel attacks.
Bao et al. [99] 2017 Privacy, security and 
authentication
TESLA protocol [97]; Bloom 
Filters [75]
Uses a new certificate revocation mechanism.
through a secure secret channel. The methods used are not simple 
and moreover using a centralized TA is not scalable.
The secure privacy-preserving protocol presented by Lin et 
al. [96] aims to reduce the overhead related to signing and veri-
fying packets based on public key cryptography. They propose at-
taching a short message authentication code tag with each packet 
instead of a signature. As in the TESLA protocol [97], each vehicle 
generates a hash chain h1, h2, ..., hn from a random seed S; here, 
hn = S , and hi = H j−i(h j) for i < j, where H is a hash function. 
Each element in the hash chain is used as key to generate MAC 
codes for several packets and the keys are released after a short 
delay δ (as in [97]) for the receiver to authenticate the packet.
The privacy-preserving authentication scheme presented by Bao 
et al. [99] uses TESLA protocol [97] and Bloom Filters [75]. This 
protocol complements the work of Lyu et al. [102] in the follow-
ing aspects: (i) To preserve privacy, the RSUs assign timestamp 
based pseudonyms to vehicles within each group which is deter-
mined based on speed, direction and other factors; (ii) In contrast 
to TESLA, public key rebroadcasting for new vehicles is done us-
ing Bloom Filters; (iii) The certificate revocation mechanism used 
to detect malicious vehicles differs from the one used in [102]. 
Table 5 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols 
discussed in this section.
3.4. Protocols using bilinear pairing based cryptography
Lin et al. [103] present a conditional privacy-preserving PKI-
based authentication protocol that uses ID-based signatures and 
bilinear pairing based cryptography. They use the short group sig-
nature scheme, introduced by Boneh et al. [108], for signing mes-
sages. It requires each vehicle store the certificates of all neighbor-
ing vehicles. In this approach, the signature verification involves 
3 × n bilinear pairing operations where n is the number of entries 
in the CRL. Moreover, if the group leader is malicious and reveals 
the key, the entire group will be compromised.
The conditional privacy-preserving protocol using bilinear pair-
ing based cryptography, presented by Lu et al. [32], aims to address 
the overhead related to preloading the OBUs with large number 
of pseudonyms to preserve anonymity and the overhead due to 
certificate distribution/verification and revocation. To achieve this, 
each OBU issues a request for a short-time anonymous key certifi-
cate from the nearby RSU and also checks with the RSU for the 
latest CRL. Using the certificate, the OBU generates pseudonyms 
and uses it for communicating anonymously. This would require 
RSUs to be deployed densely. Also, creating pseudonyms can cause 
delay and the certificate revocation scheme is not clear.
The Aggregate Privacy Preserving Authentication (APPA) proto-
col presented by Zhang et al. [78] also uses a TA to issue the initial 
bilinear pairing based security parameters and keys to vehicles. 
This scheme facilitates aggregating and authenticating messages in 
groups. Zhang et al. [105] propose a conditional privacy-preserving 
authentication protocol based on self-certified public key encryp-
tion [106], and bilinear pairing. Their aim is to reduce the overhead 
involved in generation and distribution of pseudonyms and the 
related certificates. Their approach requires the installation of a 
tamper-proof device in each vehicle. Every vehicle that participates 
in VANET needs to have a tamper-proof device installed, which 
may limit the participation of vehicles in VANETs.
Huang et al.’s [104] scheme, like many others, uses a TA (usu-
ally the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)) to issue the initial 
security parameters and keys to vehicles, based on bilinear pairing. 
The TA also issues a token that uniquely and anonymously identi-
fies the vehicle. Then, the vehicle uses this token to authenticate 
itself to the nearby RSU to get pseudonym token. This pseudonym 
token contains only the credentials for the vehicle to generate 
pseudonyms. The vehicle then uses this token to generate its own 
pseudonyms. After generating pseudonyms, the vehicles use ID-
based encryption [45] for exchanging messages securely with other 
vehicles. RSUs cannot revoke the certificate of malicious vehicles 
because they do not have private information (such as ID) of the 
vehicles. The TA is responsible for revoking the certificate of mali-
cious vehicles. A vehicle can send a report about malicious vehicles 
to nearby RSU and the RSU will send that report to the TA, based 
on which the TA can revoke the certificate of the vehicle.
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Table 6
Summary of protocols using bilinear pairing based cryptography.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Lin et al. [103] 2007 Privacy, security and 
authentication
PKI-based authentication; Group 
signatures
OBUs have to save all the third party certificates 
from the neighboring vehicles which has associated 
overheads; if the group leader is malicious and 
reveals the key, the entire group is compromised; 
cannot efficiently deal with compromised vehicles; 
group-signatures generally have high signature 
verification and revocation costs.
Lu et al. [32] 2008 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Bilinear pairing based cryptography, 
RSU generated pseudonyms
Resolves RSU compromise attack; addresses the 
overhead related to pre-loading the OBUs with a 
large number of pseudonyms and certificates; latency 
that arises from generation of pseudonym keys by 
the RSUs; frequent interactions with the RSUs are 
required; requires dense deployment of RSUs; no 
clear revocation scheme.
Huang et al. [104] 2011 Authentication, security and 
privacy
Bilinear pairing, ID-based 
encryption [45]
Can handle message replay/modification attacks, 
impersonation attacks and deal with compromised 
RSUs; the use of ECC has associated overhead.
Zhang et al. [105] 2013 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Self-certified public keys [106] and 
bilinear pairing
Proved to be conditional privacy-preserving under 
random oracle model.
Azees et al. [107] 2017 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Bilinear pairing based cryptography The authors claim that their scheme for verification 
of certificates and signatures is faster and more 
efficient than some of the schemes proposed in the 
literature.
The protocol proposed by Azees et al. [107] is based on bilinear 
pairing based cryptography; the authors claim that it can track ma-
licious/compromised vehicles and RSUs. Although bilinear pairing 
based cryptography generally has high computation overhead, their 
performance analysis shows that their approach performs better 
than seven other protocols with respect to certificate and signature 
verification costs. The TA generates pseudonyms (the authors call 
them dummy ids) for vehicles and RSUs for preserving anonymity. 
Distributing CRLs to vehicles and RSUs is still the responsibility of 
the TA. Given the large number of pseudonyms and the associated 
certificates allocated to the vehicles, overheads associated with dis-
tributing CRLs as well as verifying the authenticity of messages 
using CRLs could be high. However, the authors do not discuss this 
overhead.
Table 6 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the proto-
cols discussed in this section.
3.5. Protocols that can cope with compromised RSUs and vehicles
Jung et al. [109] propose a conditional privacy-preserving au-
thentication protocol. They claim it is better than the one pre-
sented by Lu et al. [32], because it is robust against compromised 
RSUs. They use a TA (called membership manager) to assign Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) keys to OBUs and a group sign-
ing key to each RSU. The RSUs generate anonymous certificates 
for vehicles within its region. The TA stores the MAC keys and 
the IDs of the vehicles for tracing vehicles in case of disputes. 
An OBU requests the nearby RSU for anonymous certificates for 
a given time period; the RSU authenticates the OBU and gener-
ates multiple short-term certificates and sends them to the OBU. 
The OBU authenticates the RSU using CRL issued by the TA, ac-
cepts the certificates issued by the RSU, and uses them for sending 
authenticated messages. In contrast to many other protocols in the 
literature, the conditional privacy-preserving authentication proto-
col presented by Wang et al. [110] uses decentralized certificate 
authorities and two factor authentication for ensuring privacy and 
non-repudiation. This ensures a vehicle’s privacy even if all RSUs 
are compromised; this protocol also incurs low computation and 
communication overheads compared with some of the existing 
protocols.
The primary goal of the pseudonymous authentication scheme 
with strong privacy preservation (PASS) presented by Sun et 
al. [111] is to keep the length of the CRL linear in terms of 
the number of vehicles revoked, not in terms of the number of 
pseudonyms assigned as in many other protocols. To accomplish 
this, they use hash chain based two-layered pseudonym genera-
tion method. This scheme uses a decentralized approach based on 
proxy re-signatures for updating the certificates of vehicles using 
RSUs and not the TA. This scheme can also handle compromised 
RSUs. Raya et al. [112] present a distributed solution for identifying 
and evicting misbehaving or faulty nodes in VANETs. Sedjelmaci 
et al. [113] also propose an intrusion detection scheme based on 
game theory to detect as well as predict the vehicles that are likely 
to misbehave in the future. They claim that their scheme can de-
tect false alerts and Sybil attacks. Table 7 summarizes the protocols 
discussed in this section.
Next, we discuss some of the protocols that assume the instal-
lation of a tamper-proof device or smart card on each vehicle to 
store relevant information such as keys and passwords securely.
3.6. Protocols based on smart cards and tamper-proof devices
Conventional PKI [120] based schemes require each vehicle to 
verify the signatures of each of the other vehicles sending mes-
sages to it; this results in computational overhead for the OBUs of 
the vehicles. To overcome this drawback of PKI based approach, ID-
based Batch Verification (IBV) [119] scheme was proposed. Under 
IBV scheme, an RSU can verify the signatures of multiple mes-
sages all at once; so signature verification is more efficient under 
this approach. The authors use ID-based cryptography for gener-
ating private keys associated with pseudo-identities. However, the 
IBV [119] scheme depends on the availability of a tamper-proof 
hardware device on each vehicle to securely store the system-wide 
secret key. Since the system wide secret key is stored on tamper-
proof hardware of each vehicle, if one of these devices is compro-
mised, the whole system is compromised. Moreover, this does not 
ensure privacy of vehicles because real ID of a vehicle could be 
traced by other vehicles.
The authentication protocol presented by Ying and Nayak [117,
118] uses dynamic login IDs to preserve privacy. The user gets a 
smart card loaded with the vehicle’s pseudonym and password. 
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Table 7
Summary of the protocols that can deal with compromised RSUs and/or vehicles.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Jung et al. [109] 2009 Privacy and authentication Bilinear pairing, ID-based group 
signature scheme [108] and universal 
re-encryption scheme [114]
Robust against compromised RSUs; incurs involved in 
issuing certificates, and CRLs; group-signatures 
generally have high signature verification and 
revocation costs.
Sun et al. [111] 2010 Authentication, security and 
privacy
Bilinear pairing, hash chains, Schnorr 
signatures [115]
Ensures authentication and privacy; centralized 
approach, although RSUs are involved in re-keying; 
requires dense deployment of RSUs; the pseudonym 
generation method used reduces key management 
overhead; bilinear pairing based operations have 
associated overhead.
Wang et al. [110] 2016 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Decentralized certificate authority 
and two-factor authentication; 
bilinear pairing based cryptography
Reduced communication overhead; bilinear pairing 
based cryptography incurs high overhead.
Table 8
Summary of protocols that make use of smart-cards and tamper-proof devices.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Paruchuri and Durresi [116] 2010 Authentication, privacy, and 
security
Smart cards to store keys and 
perform encryption/decryption
Requires the use of smart cards.
Ying and Nayak [117] 2014 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Login ids are generated 
dynamically for ensuring privacy
Smart cards are used for generating login ids 
dynamically; it can resist password attacks, 
and impersonation attacks; can tolerate smart 
card loss; can handle compromised RSUs.
Ying and Nayak [118] 2017 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Diffie-Helman protocol; smart 
cards; hash functions; centralized 
trusted authority for loading 
smart-cards with login id and 
password
Can resist smart card loss attack; can also 
resist impersonation and password guessing 
attack.
[119] 2008 Authentication, batch 
verification
ID-based cryptography; 
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) 
signature [52]; tamper-proof device
The real ID of the vehicles could be tracked; 
vulnerable to impersonation attack.
Smart card inserted into the vehicle’s OBU, authenticates its owner 
by asking for the real ID and password and generates dynamic lo-
gin identity for the user and sends it to the nearby RSU. Upon 
receiving this message, the RSU verifies if it is valid, computes 
its own dynamic login id and sends its dynamic login id and the 
dynamic login id of the vehicle to the TA. The TA computes the 
anonymous keys and the corresponding certificates for the vehicle 
and sends them to the RSU securely. The RSU then broadcasts the 
keys and certificates securely to the vehicles in the region and the 
corresponding vehicles receive them and use them for communi-
cation. Their privacy-preserving anonymous authentication scheme 
not only authenticates received messages but also verifies the le-
gitimacy of the senders of the messages (i.e., it checks if the sender 
is a malicious node which forged the ID of some legitimate node). 
In addition, to reduce the computational complexity, they do not 
use bilinear pairing based cryptography. It allows the user’s pass-
word to be changed dynamically. So, this scheme can resist smart 
card loss attack, impersonation attack, and password guessing at-
tack.
The protocol presented by Paruchuri and Durresi [116] also uses 
smart cards to generate anonymous keys on-the-fly for establish-
ing secure V2V as well as V2I communication. The TA issues smart 
cards as well as the keys to the vehicles and certificates to RSUs. 
The vehicle’s ID, required cryptographic keys, and driver informa-
tion are stored on the smart card. To send a message to vehicles 
within its group, first a vehicle needs to get a session key securely 
from the nearby RSU. To send a message m to a vehicle within its 
group, it encrypts the message m and the ID of the OBU and the 
signature of m (hash of m encrypted with its private key V Pr ) en-
crypted with the public key E R SU Pu of the RSU using the session 
key Ke as follows and sends it:
E Ke (m, E R SU Pu (O BU I D , E V Pr (H(m))))
A receiving vehicle can decrypt the message using the session key 
issued by the RSU. However, it cannot decrypt the second part 
because the private Key of the RSU is needed for decrypting the 
second part. The second part is used by the RSU to trace misbe-
having nodes, when necessary. Table 8 summarizes the strengths 
and weaknesses of protocols discussed in this section.
Next, we discuss some of the protocols that minimize the over-
head involved in using the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for gen-
erating and assigning keys, pseudonyms, certificates, and CRLs to 
vehicles and/or RSUs.
3.7. Minimizing the overhead involved in public key infrastructure (PKI) 
based protocols
The anonymous authentication protocol presented by Wang et 
al. [121] uses the TA to assign each vehicle and each RSU a long 
term certificate during registration. Each RSU is responsible for 
assigning a master key to each vehicle entering its region after 
authenticating the vehicle based on its long term certificate. Then 
the vehicle uses the master key to generate pseudonyms locally 
and uses them to sign messages to preserve anonymity. This ap-
proach has lower signature verification overhead compared to the 
protocols presented in [73] and [122]. Moreover, it supports both 
single and batch authentication of messages.
The Secure and Authenticated Key Management Protocol (SA-
KMP) presented by Hengchuan et al. [133], combines the idea of 
the Public Key Regime (PKR) (which delegates the distribution of 
public keys to the RSUs, eliminating the need to distribute dig-
ital certificates) proposed by Shen et al. [134] and the idea of 
3-D matrix key distribution scheme (which generates the keys dy-
namically instead of preloading the keys), proposed by Hamid et 
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al. [135,136]. Wasef et al. [123] propose a mechanism based on PKI 
which supports not only location privacy but also authentication; 
it also uses a distributed approach for certificate revocation. They 
use the Message Authentication Acceleration (MAAC) [72] protocol 
to make the revocation checking process faster without checking 
the CRLs. However, their solution can only preserve the location 
privacy of vehicles within its group. They also propose a method 
for mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Biswas and Misic [124], [125], [126] use proxy signatures for 
privacy-preserving authentication. One drawback of this solution is 
that it requires larger keys for generating and verifying signatures. 
As a result, it incurs higher computational cost compared to other 
competitive schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) to 
provide similar security strength.
Dong et al. [127] propose a privacy-preserving data forward-
ing scheme for service oriented VANETs based on Lite-TA-based 
public key cryptography and on-path onion encryption scheme. 
This scheme has lower encryption cost and public key manage-
ment complexity compared to conventional public key encryption 
schemes. However, since this approach requires relaying nodes to 
encrypt the message before forwarding to prevent adversaries from 
tracing message flows, it incurs higher computation overhead for 
forwarding packets.
Haas et al. [128] propose a method for quick, organized and 
efficient distribution of CRLs through V2V communication [137]. 
This scheme ensures backward privacy of revoked vehicles prior to 
their revocation. They use the probabilistic data structure Bloom 
filters [75] for quickly checking CRLs. However, false positives may 
occur. But they claim that, false positives can be avoided by dis-
carding the certificate of the vehicles that may trigger a false 
positive. The use of Bloom filters reduces the overhead incurred 
for checking CRLs. It is observed that the distribution of CRLs 
through V2V communication is more efficient and cost effective 
than the RSU-based distribution scheme because it does not re-
quire widespread deployment of RSUs.
Many of the research works based on chameleon hash signa-
ture [130] using fixed public keys for authentication do not guar-
antee message unlinkability. Shen et al. [129] address this problem 
and propose a light weight privacy-preserving protocol that relies 
on Elliptic Curve based chameleon hash signature and dynamic 
public keys. They consider the registration phase and the mutual 
authentication phase between OBUs and RSUs in their protocol. 
They also considered the TA tracking phase to ensure authentic-
ity and traceability. Whenever any suspicious event occurs, the TA 
can recover the real identity of the OBU that created the event by 
executing the TA tracking phase. The use of chameleon hash-based 
signature for messages helps in preventing replay attacks and im-
personation attacks. However, V2V authentication is not addressed 
in this protocol.
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) proposed 
by Whyte et al. [131] is based on PKI; it was developed under 
a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of 
Transportation (USDOT), the leading candidate for V2V security 
backend design in the United States. This scheme adds some ad-
ditional features such as the number of vehicles it supports and 
tries to achieve a tradeoff between security, privacy and efficiency 
of traditional PKI based approaches. Additionally, they propose (i) 
a frequent certificate changing (e.g., every 5 minutes) scheme to 
enhance protection against attackers outside of the SCMS and (ii) 
organizational separation of operations of SCMS to protect against 
attackers inside the SCMS.
Alshaer [132] proposed a secure connection model based on 
the Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that utilizes trusted 
RSUs to establish secure connections and distribute secret keys 
to vehicles within their transmission range. The probability of 
the number of reachable neighboring vehicles that a Communi-
cation Enabled Vehicle (CEV) can reach has been derived using 
Exponential distribution of time and space headways with a Ro-
bustness Factor (EwRF). They claim that suitable statistical distri-
bution (e.g., exponential distribution, Generalized Extreme Value 
(GEV) distribution) that characterizes inter-vehicle spacing can ac-
curately contribute to secure connectivity. This approach requires 
the widespread deployment of RSUs and RSUs are assumed to be 
reliable. Table 9 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the 
protocols discussed in this section.
3.8. Message aggregation and cooperative message authentication
Multiple vehicles could observe the same phenomena on the 
road and try to disseminate it to other vehicles which wastes 
bandwidth. To address this problem, message aggregation (as has 
been proposed for sensor networks earlier) has been proposed. 
Moreover, to reduce the overhead involved in message authenti-
cation, cooperative message authentication wherein vehicles share 
the overhead due to message authentication, has been proposed. 
We discuss the protocols in these categories in this subsection.
3.8.1. Protocols using message aggregation
The Aggregated Emergency Message Authentication (AEMA) 
scheme proposed by Zhu et al. [138] is based on bilinear pairing. 
Under AEMA, each vehicle registers with the TA (they call it an 
Offline Security Manager (OSM)) and obtains its public key certifi-
cate. Then, when a vehicle needs to send an emergency message, it 
uses the following format (T ype, Loc, I D, T ime, Sig, Cert) to send 
it. Here, T ype indicates the type of the event, Loc is the location 
where the event occurred, I D is the pseudo ID of the vehicle, T ime
is the time when the event occurred, Sig denotes the signature of 
the message, and Cert is the certificate. The receiver verifies the 
validity of the certificate Cert and the signature Sig and accepts 
the message. The authors assume that each event is uniquely de-
termined by T ype, Loc, and T ime. Hence, an intermediate node 
receiving the message can eliminate duplicates and aggregate the 
messages. The overhead involved in computing the signature based 
on bilinear pairing is of some concern. In addition, the algorithm 
depends on the central OSM for issuing certificates. The authors 
assume that each observed event has a unique type. This scheme 
does not ensure location privacy of vehicles because each message 
carries the location information of vehicles.
Dietzel et al. [139] proposed selective attestation and trust fu-
sion to detect attacks as well as mitigate their effects for seman-
tic aggregation in VANETs. Their approach is based on a generic 
data aggregation model, which makes it extensible and suitable for 
the existing data aggregation schemes. In the trust fusion mecha-
nism, multiple warnings of the same event are linked to alleviate 
the need for a Global Unique Identifier system (GUID) by using a 
fuzzy logic technique. However, the bandwidth needed for selec-
tive attestation could slow down the message dissemination pro-
cess. Many of the existing message aggregation techniques require 
roads to be segmented into small fixed-size regions for aggregating 
messages originating from these regions. However, messages origi-
nating across regions cannot be aggregated using these approaches. 
Van der Heijden et al. [140] address this problem and present a 
scheme that allows more dynamic aggregation of messages.
Next, we discuss protocols in which vehicles cooperate to au-
thenticate messages in order to reduce the overhead involved in 
message authentication.
3.8.2. Protocols that use cooperative message authentication or batch 
verification
Hao et al.’s [141] distributed key management and Co-operative 
Message Authentication Protocol (CMAP) based on short group sig-
nature [142] can detect compromised RSUs and the malicious vehi-
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Table 9
Summary of the protocols that address the overhead involved in PKI based protocols.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the paper Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Wasef et al. [123] 2010 Location privacy, 
authentication, and 
certificate revocation
PKI and Message Authentication 
Acceleration (MAAC) protocol
Fast revocation check process and mitigates 
DoS attacks; location privacy may not be 
ensured against outsider attacks.
Biswas and Misic [124–126] 2010 Self authentication and 
anonymous message 
delivery
PKI, proxy signatures Preserves message integrity and anonymity; 
RSU assisted proxy signatures.
Dong et al. [127] 2011 Privacy-preserving data 
forwarding; specifically 
designed for service 
oriented VANETs
Lite-TA-based public key 
cryptography; on-path onion 
encryption scheme
Efficient, robust and ensures higher trust level; 
high computational overhead.
Haas et al. [128] 2011 Distribution of CRLs PKI and Bloom filters [75] Does not require ubiquitous deployment of 
RSUs; false positives can be prevented; 
computational overhead is somewhat low.
Shen et al. [129] 2012 Secure communication Chameleon hash signature [130] Ensures unlinkability, traceability and defense 
against replay attack; V2V authentication is 
not addressed.
Whyte et al. [131] 2013 Security credential 
management system; V2V 
communication
Public Key Infrastructure The authors try to achieve a tradeoff between 
privacy, security and efficiency; decentralized 
certificate distribution; frequent certificate 
changes could cause high overhead.
Alshaer [132] 2015 Securing VANETs 
connectivity with the 
support of RSUs
Vehicular Public Key 
Infrastructure (VPKI)
Can predict uplink and downlink connectivity 
probabilities in VANETs; assumes RSUs are 
trustworthy.
Hengchuan et al. [133] 2016 Authenticated key 
management
Public key regime (PKR) [134]; 
the 3-D matrix key distribution 
scheme [135,136]
This approach is more scalable than PKI based 
approaches; key generation takes less time 
compared to Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and 
Diffie-Hellman protocols.
Wang et al. [121] 2017 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Does not use PKI for generating 
pseudonyms and the related 
certificates to vehicles; vehicles 
generate their own pseudonyms
This approach has less signature verification 
overhead compared to the protocols presented 
in [73] and [122]; it supports both single and 
batch authentication.
cles colluding with them. Vehicles getting keys from the same RSU 
form a group. To ensure reliable key distribution, messages are en-
crypted using Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) 
and are transmitted using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). 
This scheme allows the cooperative verifiers to cooperatively au-
thenticate messages. Cooperative verifiers are selected dynamically 
and distributively based on their own geographic locations relative 
to the sender of the message. However, a malicious vehicle can 
pretend to be a cooperative verifier by creating many Sybil nodes 
within its transmission range, which makes this scheme vulnerable 
to Sybil attack.
Most of the research work on secure incentive schemes focus 
only on cooperative packet forwarding; but due to the high mo-
bility of vehicles, packets could be lost. To address this problem, 
Lai et al. [143] propose a Secure Incentive scheme for Reliable Co-
operative downloading in highway VANETs (SIRC) that uses two 
phases, namely, cooperative downloading and cooperative forward-
ing which encourage vehicles to cooperate through an incentive 
scheme; SIRC utilizes aggregated Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) sig-
nature [52] to cooperate with others in securely downloading-and-
forwarding packets. In this scheme, a reputation system is imple-
mented to reward the cooperating vehicles and punish the mali-
cious vehicles. In addition, a partial prepayment strategy is used 
to minimize the payment risk to client vehicles. This scheme can 
resist various attacks such as free riding attack, DoS attacks and 
packet injection/removing attack. The performance evaluation of 
SIRC shows that it has high download success rate, low download 
delay, and moderate computation and communication overhead. 
A disadvantage of this approach is that the reputation information 
about vehicles which have high variability in their spatial distribu-
tion need to be calculated and stored.
Wang and Liu [144] proposed a scheme that satisfies the se-
curity requirements in Vehicular Heterogeneous Networks (VHNs) 
wherein support for cooperative communication among various 
types of networks such as networks based on DSRC-based on IEEE 
802.11p, Device to Device (D2D) communication and cellular com-
munication needs to be provided. A mode selection algorithm that 
allows the OBUs to check the remaining lifetime of a packet and 
switch between three different modes (DSRC, D2D-V and cellular 
networks) is also presented. They found that sufficient power and 
vehicle density are the main factors for the successful transmission 
of messages securely in such networks.
Lin and Li [145] presented a cooperative message authentica-
tion scheme to reduce not only the overhead involved in mes-
sage authentication but also the authentication delay. This scheme 
tries to minimize the authentication overhead on the same mes-
sage by different vehicles when vehicles are allowed to coopera-
tively authenticate messages. To encourage vehicles to cooperate 
in message authentication, vehicles are issued evidence tokens. An 
evidence token issued to a vehicle reflects its contribution to au-
thentication in the past; this encourages vehicles to participate 
in the message authentication process, which helps in distribut-
ing the authentication load among many vehicles. Evidence tokens 
are obtained from the TA via the RSU in its current region. It also 
uses a large number of pseudonyms, which could result in long 
CRLs. Jiang et al. [146] also propose an authentication scheme un-
der which requests from multiple vehicles can be authenticated 
in batches rather than one by one. Cheon and Yi [147] proposed 
a method for batch verification of multiple signatures generated 
by different signers as well as a single signer. They showed how 
this technique can be applied to the modified DSA and ECDSA 
based signatures. They also show that their batch verification ap-
proach is seven times faster than individual verification. Wasef et 
al. [148,149] proposed a flexible certificate distribution scheme and 
an efficient way for vehicles to update their certificates. To de-
crease the message authentication overhead, they also proposed 
14 D. Manivannan et al. / Vehicular Communications 25 (2020) 100247
Table 10
Brief summary of protocols that support message aggregation, cooperative message authentication, and/or batch verification.
Paper Year published Focus area(s) of the 
paper
Method(s) used Strengths and weaknesses
Zhu et al. [138] 2008 Emergency message 
authentication
Bilinear pairing; message aggregation Does not ensure location privacy; useful for propagation 
of short emergency messages only.
Dietzel et al. [139] 2010 Secure data 
aggregation
Generic aggregation model and Fuzzy 
logic methodology
Extensible and alleviates the need of a Global Unique 
Identifier system (GUID); bandwidth overhead could 
decrease dissemination speed.
Hao et al. [141] 2011 Authentication, security 
and privacy
Bilinear pairing; short group 
signatures [142]
Cooperative message authentication to speed up 
authentication; does not ensure location privacy of 
vehicles; vehicles in different regions cannot securely 
exchange messages; group-signatures generally have 
high signature verification and revocation costs; RSUs 
are assumed to be trustworthy; cooperative 
authentication would work only if the density of 
vehicles is high; susceptible to location modification 
because messages are selected for verification based on 
location information.
Jiang et al. [146] 2013 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Pseudonyms and ID-based signature, 
hash message authentication code
Supports batch authentication of requests; Tamper-proof 
devices (TPDs) are needed to store pseudonyms; TPDs 
could be susceptible to side-channel attacks.
Lin and Li [145] 2013 Privacy, security and 
authentication
Cooperative message authentication; 
uses large number of pseudonyms for 
ensuring anonymity
Due to the large number of pseudonyms issued to 
vehicles, CRLs could grow.
Lai et al. [143] 2017 Reliable cooperative 
downloading
PKI; incentive scheme based on 
reputation
Can resist different types of attacks including DoS 
attacks; can be difficult to calculate and store reputation 
information correctly.
Wang and Liu [144] 2018 Secure cooperative 
communication in 
heterogeneous 
vehicular networks
PKI, stochastic geometry theory and 
optimization
Flexible; allows to switch between DSRC, D2D-V and 
cellular networks modes; Requires OBUs with high 
computation power.
a method for verifying certificate-based signatures of messages in 
batches. Zhang and Zhang [150] developed a method for aggregat-
ing signatures in a certificate-less public key setting.
Table 10 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the pro-
tocols discussed in this section.
4. Recommendations and open issues for further research
For the widespread deployment of VANETs, the following im-
portant issues need to be thoroughly addressed and efficient, scal-
able solutions for them need to be found: (i) authentication of 
vehicles and messages (ii) secure message dissemination and (iii) 
privacy of users need to be protected.
4.1. Scalable and distributed authentication and secure message 
dissemination protocols
VANETs could support various safety-related applications such 
as safe driving, collision avoidance, timely reporting of events such 
as accidents to law enforcement agencies, facilitating the law en-
forcement agencies to reconstruct events such as accidents and 
speeding violations, hazard awareness and many others. Moreover, 
VANET users could also benefit from infotainment and software 
download. For implementing these facilities, scalable solutions for 
authentication and secure message dissemination need to be de-
signed. Most of the solutions presented in the literature for this 
problem are centralized. Few attempts have been made to solve 
these problems using decentralized approaches. Further research 
is needed to address this scalability issue. Cooperative message 
authentication has been proposed to distribute the burden of au-
thentication among vehicles. Such protocols could be susceptible 
to Sybil attacks because a malicious node can create several Sybil 
nodes. These protocols, in general, use location information to se-
lect messages. So, these protocols could be susceptible to location 
modification attacks.
4.2. Privacy of vehicles
Ensuring the privacy of vehicles is an important issue in 
VANETs. Otherwise, vehicle owners’ life could be jeopardized. So, 
in all communications, a vehicle should not use its real identity. To 
solve this problem, several solutions have been proposed. A vast 
majority of the solutions proposed use pseudonyms instead of 
the real ids of vehicles in the communication. This requires large 
number of pseudonyms to be loaded into the vehicles OBUs and 
they need to be kept secret. Moreover, to punish malicious vehi-
cles (i.e., vehicles disseminating malicious messages or modifying 
the messages sent by other vehicles), vehicles’ real ids need to be 
traced. Thus, even though privacy needs to be preserved, author-
ities should still be able to trace and punish malicious vehicles. 
Vehicles cannot use the same pseudonym for a long time, be-
cause then, based on the path traversed by vehicles, an intruder 
can associate the pseudonym with the real id. Thus pseudonyms 
should be changed frequently. Some authors suggest changing 
pseudonyms every five seconds to prevent an intruder from link-
ing two messages to the same vehicles and tracking the vehicle. 
So, each vehicle needs to be assigned millions of pseudonyms dur-
ing its lifetime and also a scalable mechanism for tracking which 
vehicle has been assigned what pseudonym needs to be designed 
and implemented. Moreover, when a vehicle is revoked, the certifi-
cates associated with the pseudonyms of the revoked vehicle need 
to be disseminated to all vehicles/RSUs. This could lead to an expo-
nential growth of CRLs which could slow down the authentication 
of messages. So, centralized solutions are not scalable. Some solu-
tions proposed for handling this problem allow the distribution of 
the task of creating and distributing the certificates as well as CRLs 
to the RSUs. However, more research needs to be done in devising 
highly efficient, scalable privacy-preserving methods to solve this 
problem.
D. Manivannan et al. / Vehicular Communications 25 (2020) 100247 15
4.3. Availability of roadside infrastructures
Many of the solutions presented assume the availability of 
RSUs. However, we will not see widespread deployment of RSUs 
in the near future. So, solutions proposed in the future should also 
consider the scenarios in which there is no widespread deploy-
ment of RSUs. Due to advances in new technologies and a growing 
number of vehicles, the design of reliable and scalable VANETs ar-
chitectures that support multiple technologies (e.g., DSRC, D2D-V 
and Cellular Networks) is also important. In such a scenario, vehi-
cles need to authenticate with entities in different networks. This 
is especially challenging because vehicles in VANETs use privacy-
preserving authentication and other networks do not use privacy-
preserving authentication.
4.4. Metrics for evaluating protocols designed for VANETs
Some researchers have proposed metrics for evaluating proto-
cols for authentication and security in VANETs. However, these 
metrics do not capture all the requirements. Metrics need to be 
developed and standardized; moreover, simulators and testbeds 
for evaluating protocols based on these metrics need to be im-
plemented.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a survey of papers published in the 
last ten years that address privacy, authentication and secure mes-
sage dissemination in VANETs. Based on the tools and techniques 
used in the papers, we classified the papers into various categories. 
We made a comparative study of the protocols in each category 
and discussed their strengths and weaknesses. Then, we discussed 
some of the open issues that remain to be addressed. We hope this 
survey will serve as ready reference for other researchers working 
in these areas and also help in addressing some of the open issues.
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